Tuesday, March 6, 1951 Bruce Diary (Duplicate)

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EXCISE

Four Power Conference

2nd Day

3084

Mr. Davies (United Kingdom) presiding.

Jessup:

I do not believe Mr. Gromyko would expect me to reply to some of the statements made by him yesterday, but I reserve the right to do so if necessary. It would waste the time of the conference.

Since the Soviet Government has admitted discussion of subjects other than Germany, it would be proper to ensure that the agenda would include the contemplation of reasons which have led to the existence of tension in Europe.

My Government has made it clear that it is not the purpose of these participants to arrive at a solution of problems but to enable their presentation for the consideration of the four Foreign Ministers.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY CKC DATE 7-1-81
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

I will now make observations of a preliminary nature on the Soviet agenda proposals.

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A difference has been expressed in the points of views of

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the Governments regarding the fundamental causes of tension.

Two possible approaches:

1. Formulate wording of items on agenda so as to influence the results of the Ministers' meeting.

Two difficulties with above approach:

a. Could not agree among ourselves.

b. This sort of approach would not influence our Ministers.

2. Formulate items on agenda so as not to exclude development of arguments by Ministers, and not to color in fashion to prejudge any of the problems at issue.

Second approach, adopted by Mr. Davies yesterday in his presentation of agenda, is desired by the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

I will illustrate by brief comparison between the U.K. and the Soviet suggestions.

I understand the Soviet Government wishes to identify the causes of tension and how to solve them. Our suggested item 1 places no limitation on discussion of this point.

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Item 2 re Austria. It is pertinent to recall the 1943 declaration at Moscow demanding the reestablishment of a free and independent Austria.

Subsequently on many occasions the four ministers have considered this subject. The U. S. Government thought at last in 1949 agreement had been reached. Mr. Gromyko is silent on it in his proposed agenda.

Item 3. No specific reference by Gromyko to German unity which is prerequisite to a peace treaty.

In summary our agenda designed to allow all foreign ministers to engage in untrammelled discussion with no stacking of cards.

Regret Soviet proposal does not satisfy requirements for examination capable of success of problems involved, while our text does.

Item 1 of the Soviet agenda is tendentious and unacceptable. Our item 1 opens this question for full comment by the Soviet Government.

I will pass now to item 3 of the Soviet agenda. The problem of existing level of armaments will be insisted upon by the U.S.

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and can be dealt with under Item 1 of the Western agenda. This is before the United Nations.

Now for Soviet Item 2. The subject matter included in our Item 3's language is more satisfactory.

Parodi:

I am very disappointed over what transpired yesterday as to press releases. We should avoid anything like this in the future which, merely for propaganda reasons, exposed the divergence of views between us [the Russians had published texts of proposed agenda]. Because of Gromyko's remarks on what Davies said yesterday, I must refer to these comments. Gromyko has accused our countries of being aggressive. If he will interrogate any chance-met Frenchman, he will find no trace of aggressive intent. But equally he will find French devoted to their own defense, and resolved upon the necessary armament for this purpose. Peace is our major concern.

I shall now turn to the draft agenda. We understand perfectly the importance attaching to the demilitarization of Germany, and the particular importance the Soviet delegation attaches to it.

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A year ago no one thought of the rearmament of Germany, but since then the international situation has gravely deteriorated. We now feel ourselves profoundly insecure. We are not trying to avoid discussion of German rearmament but wish to do so in context of various factors contributing to this sense of insecurity. I think we should be able to arrive at an agreement but the difficulties over respective agenda must be overcome. As to order of questions, the first Soviet item can also figure on our first item. The agenda must not go to the substance of matters to be considered by the Foreign Ministers. It must be objective and must not conduce to any prejudgments.

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[redacted]

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Parodi finished at 5:10. Adjournment for tea.

Resumed at 5:30.

Daviest.

German demilitarization cannot be discussed outside context of international tensions prevailing today. Rearmament of Germany

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is a result, not a cause of the deterioration of which M. Parodi spoke. It would be only one of questions to be discussed under our Item 1. Present Soviet wording in this regard is tendentious and we cannot accept it. Endorses Jessup objection to prejudging conclusions by agenda wording. Hopes Mr. Gromyko will reflect on whether he cannot accept our agenda as a framework for discussions by the Foreign Ministers.

Gromyko:

The Soviet de" ation has thoroughly studied the Western proposals. Will make some preliminary observations. Take Allied Item 1. This is drawn in such a way as not to be directed in any way toward peaceful relationship between the Four Powers. This is a verbal hoax. It does not provide for essential question of reduction of armed forces of the four great countries. Nothing is satisfactory which does not include item of "armaments race". We are told not to worry, that the Soviet will have the opportunity to express its views on German militarization. Soviet Item 3 approaches Allied No. 1 but in much more specific and directed to useful ends.

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Take Allied Item 3, Unity of

Germany and Treaty of Peace. This does not provide for withdrawal of occupying forces. The Soviet Government speaks lucidly and concretely on this point, leaving no room for ambiguity. We know what pressures are being exercised by the United States Government on the Japanese Government to preserve occupation of Japan by American troops. Similarly if the United States does not have the same designs in Germany why does it not permit an examination envisaged for Germany by the Soviet item? But this is not the only defect of this point which has other vices. The question of a peace treaty seems to be isolated from that of German unity. We have been discussing these matters for years, and if we adopt the Allied item these discussions may go on for months or years without achieving German unity or agreeing upon a peace treaty. Soviet Item 2 is much better than the Allied proposals. Conclusion of peace treaty would provide for unity of Germany as agreed upon at Potsdam. The Soviet Government does not fear creation of unified German state. Would now like to return to German demilitarization and demilitarization on which

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I have made preliminary remarks. The June 5, 1945 surrender terms called for the elimination of all German armed forces. The Potsdam agreement provided against renewed threat to peace by remilitarization.

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Gromyko ended at 7:15 p.m.

Jessup:

I express my astonishment and regret at the extraordinary diatribe of Gromyko which is so foreign to the purposes for which we attended this meeting.

I don't know to whom remarks are addressed unless having violated his agreement yesterday in what he divulged to the press he has pressed on in the same spirit. Surely these remarks are not meant for the other participants. The last Russian note specifically said that matters of substance would not be dealt with here. Gromyko has done nothing else. If it were appropriate to enter into substance it would be well to tell Gromyko, of which he is perhaps unaware, that behind the United States note of

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February 19 lies the tension aroused by the performance of the Soviet Government since the war. Perhaps Gromyko would like to have formally on the agenda the question of the policies followed by the Soviet Government which are responsible for existing tensions, but that is not our task here.

I shall not enter into Gromyko's utterly false allegation about my Government regarding Japan. Fallacious and extraordinary remarks about some items of agenda. (Jessup took a devastating crack at Gromyko's reasoning - or lack of it.)

This is not the appropriate place to discuss the Russian violations of the Potsdam agreement - that can be handled if there is a Foreign Ministers' meeting.

Perhaps Mr. Gromyko will return here tomorrow to tell us for what purpose the Russian delegation has come here.

Ended at 7:30.

Parodi:

Until a recent date, as I have previously said, no one in any of our countries had envisaged a rearmament of Germany. Why this change? Gromyko has deformed what I said about the reaction

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of the average Frenchman. I know as well as anyone from personal experience -- and what happened to my own family -- what the German occupation meant.

Adjournment at 7:45 was suggested.

Didn't adjourn. Gromyko insisted on speaking: Don't consider it appropriate to answer some of Jessup's clumsy witticisms on what is responsible for present tensions. Lets adjourn.

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